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Summary
On March 17, 2003, President Bush, in a televised address, gave President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq a 48-hour ultimatum to flee the country or face military
conflict.  The war was launched on March 19, with a strike against a location where
Saddam and top lieutenants were believed to be meeting.  In November 2002, the
United Nations Security Council had adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final
opportunity to “comply with its  the disarmament obligations” or “face serious
consequences.”  During January and February 2003, a U.S. military buildup in the
Persian Gulf intensified and  President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly indicated that Iraq had little time left to offer
full cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors.  However, leaders of France,
Germany, Russia, and China urged that the inspections process be allowed more
time.  
The Administration and its supporters assert that Iraq is in defiance of 17
Security Council resolutions requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).  Further delay in taking action against Iraq, they argue,
would have endangered national security and undermined U.S. credibility.  Skeptics,
including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is exaggerating the
Iraqi threat and argue that the U.N. inspections process should have been extended.
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of the
United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and to
enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). 
Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation
in Iraq after any war.  U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the
country that could last two years or longer.  Whether the overthrow of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle East, or
promote instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is an issue in debate.
The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial humanitarian crisis,
including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend on the length of the
conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization.  International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if
there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war.  Estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq vary widely.  If  war leads to a spike in the price of oil, economic
growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic consequences of a war
are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues.  See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report.  This report also provides
links to other sources of information and is updated once a week.
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Most Recent Developments
For a day-by-day update on Iraq-related developments, including military
developments, see CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Daily
Developments [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs/iraqdaily.shtml].
Purpose of This Report
The Background section of this report outlines the evolution of the current
conflict with Iraq since September 11, 2001.  This section is followed by a more
detailed description and analysis of U.S. policy and a survey of congressional actions
on Iraq.  The report then reviews a range of issues that the Iraq situation has raised
for Congress.  These issue discussions have been written by CRS experts, and contact
information is provided for congressional readers seeking additional information.  In
this section and elsewhere, text boxes list CRS products that provide in-depth
information on the topics under discussion or on related topics.  The final section
links the reader to additional sources of information on the Iraq crisis.  For a list of
CRS reports related to Iraq, see CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S.
Confrontation [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
This report will be updated once each week while the Iraq crisis continues.  
Background
Bush Administration concerns about Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President Bush
named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil” nations in his January 2002
State of the Union address.  Vice President Cheney, in two August 2002 speeches,
accused  Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons of mass destruction to
dominate the Middle East and threaten U.S. oil supplies.1  These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States might act soon unilaterally against Iraq.  However,
CRS-2
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Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
in a September 12, 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President
Bush pledged to work with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common
challenge” posed by Iraq.2  H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on
October 16, authorized the use of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s
efforts to obtain prompt Security Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with U.N.
resolutions.  On November 8, 2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging,
adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the
disarmament obligations imposed under previous resolutions, or face “serious
consequences.”
Prelude to War.  During January-March 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the
Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts speculated that mid- to late March seemed a
likely time for an attack to be launched.  (See below, Military Issues.)  Officials
maintained that it would be possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of
summer, but military experts observed that conditions for fighting a war would be far
better in the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, and other top
officials during January, February,
and March expressed a high degree of
dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance
with Security Council disarmament
demands. The President said on
January 14, that “time is running out”
for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was
“sick and tired” of its “games and
deceptions.”3  On January 26, 2003,
Secretary of State Powell told the
World Economic Forum, meeting in
D a v o s ,  S w i t z e r l a n d ,  t h a t
“multilateralism cannot be an excuse
for inaction” and that the United
States “continues to reserve our
sovereign right to take military action
against Iraq alone or in a coalition of
the willing.”
President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the
Union Address on January 28, 2003.  “With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the
region.”  The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours
may lie ahead.”  Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the President also
condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United Nations and the
world.  On February 5, 2003, as discussed below under Weapons of Mass
Destruction Issues,  Secretary of State Powell detailed to the United Nations
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Security Council what he described as Iraq’s “web of lies” in denying that it has
weapons of mass destruction programs. 
On February 26, President Bush gave a major address on Iraq.  He said that the
end of Hussein’s regime would “deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron ....
And other regimes will be given a  clear warning that support for terror will not be
tolerated.” He returned to an earlier Administration theme in declaring that post-
Hussein Iraq would be turned into a democracy, which would inspire reform in other
Middle Eastern states.  Specialists challenged his assertion that transforming Iraq into
a democracy was a credible option.  They cited the strong rivalries within its
ethnically and religiously diverse population and questioned whether the United
States could mount the resolve for a process of democratization that might take years
to accomplish.4
Final Diplomatic Efforts.  Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international
support for an early armed confrontation remained limited.  President Jacques Chirac
of France was a leading critic of the U.S. approach while the Iraq issue remained
before the U.N. Security Council, maintaining that he was not convinced by the
evidence presented by Secretary of State Powell.  On February 10, at a press
conference in Paris with President Putin of Russia, Chirac said “nothing today
justifies war.” Speaking of weapons of mass destruction, Chirac added “I have no
evidence that these weapons exist in Iraq.”5  France, Germany, and Russia advocated
a strengthened inspections regime rather than an early armed conflict with Iraq, and
China took a similar position. 
On February 24, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain
introduced what was called a “second resolution” at the U.N. Security Council,
stating that Iraq had failed “to take the final opportunity afforded to it by Resolution
1441” to disarm.  The proposed resolution was regarded as authorizing the immediate
use of force to disarm Iraq.  On March 10, President Chirac said that his government
would veto the resolution, and Russian officials said that their government would
likely follow the same course.  (See below, Diplomatic Issues.)
Chirac’s stance, and the Administration’s lack of success in garnering other
support for the “second resolution,” seemed to convince U.S. officials that further
diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would prove fruitless.  President Bush flew
to the Azores for a hastily-arranged meeting with the prime ministers of Britain and
Spain on Sunday, March 16, 2003.  The meeting resulted in a pledge by the three
leaders to establish a unified, free, and prosperous Iraq under a representative
government.  At a press conference after the meeting, President Bush stated that
“Tomorrow is the day that we will determine whether or not democracy can work.”
On March 17, the three governments announced that they were withdrawing the
proposed Security Council resolution,  and President Bush went on television at 8:00
p.m. (EST) that evening to declare that unless Saddam Hussein fled Iraq within 48
hours, the result would be “military conflict, commenced at the time of our own
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choosing.”  The war began on the night of March 19, with an aerial attack against a
location where Saddam Hussein was suspected to be meeting with top Iraqi officials.
U.S. officials point out that a number of other countries supported the U.S.
demand for immediate Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions on disarmament.
Many foreign observers argue,  however, that U.N. inspectors had failed to find a
“smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
programs.  U.S. officials and others maintain that this was never the goal of the
inspections. In their view, the purpose of inspections was to verify  whether Iraq had
disarmed in compliance with past U.N. resolutions.  Iraq had not pro-actively
cooperated with the inspections process, they argue, and consequently there had been
no such verification.6 
Public Reactions.  In mid-January 2003, polls showed that a majority of
Americans wanted the support of allies before the United States launched a war
against Iraq.  The polls shifted on this point after the State of the Union message,
with a majority coming to favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval.7  Polls
shifted further in the Administration’s direction following Secretary Powell’s
February 5 presentation to the Security Council.8  Although subsequent polls showed
some slippage in support for a war, President Bush’s speech on the evening of March
17 rallied public support once again.  A Washington Post-ABC News  poll taken just
afterward, showed that 71% supported war with Iraq and that 66% supported the
President’s decision not to seek a U.N. Security Council vote.9  Polls showed that
seven in ten Americans continued to support the war after the fighting began.10
Nonetheless, many Americans oppose a war, and large anti-war demonstrations took
place in several cities on the weekend of March 15-16, followed by sharp protests in
San Francisco and a large demonstration in New York after the fighting began.
Major anti-war demonstrations had also occurred on the weekends of January 19-20
and February 15-16, and there have been demonstrations in support of
Administration policy as well.
Many reports have noted that U.S. policy on Iraq has led to a rise in anti-
Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls show strong
opposition to a war with Iraq,11 and in the Middle East.  Demonstrations against the
war in European cities on February 15-16 were widely described as “massive,” and,
as in the United States, large demonstrations also took place on March 15-16.  Large
CRS-5
demonstrations were reported in many cities worldwide after the fighting began, and
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On March 17, 2003, as noted above in Background, President Bush addressed
the American people and announced that Iraq would face conflict with the United
States if Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, did not leave Iraq within 48
hours.  The statement followed a breakdown in negotiations among U.N. Security
Council members to authorize military action.  U.N. weapons inspectors were
ordered by Secretary General Kofi Annan to leave Iraq by March 18.  On March 19,
2003, after the expiration of the 48-hour ultimatum, President Bush told the
American people that military operations against Iraq had been ordered.
In making its case for confronting Iraq, the Bush Administration has
characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in  Iraq as a grave potential threat to the
United States and to peace and security in the Middle East region.  The
Administration maintains that Iraq has active weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs that could be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s long-term goal of
dominating the Middle East.  These weapons, according to the Administration, could
be used by Iraq directly against the United States, or they could be transferred to
terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  The Administration says that the United States
cannot wait until Iraq makes further progress on WMD to confront Iraq, since Iraq
could then be stronger and the United States might have fewer military and
diplomatic options.  
In deciding to launch military action against Iraq, the Administration asserted
that Iraq is in breach of 17  U.N. Security Council resolutions –  including Resolution
1441 of November 8, 2002,  mandating that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its WMD
programs.  President Bush maintained this position despite  opposition from a
number of U.S. allies and Security Council members, including France, Germany,
Russia, and China.  These and several other countries believed that U.N. inspections
were working to disarm Iraq and should have been continued as an alternative to war.
The end of diplomatic negotiations to avert war came after the United States and
Britain were unable to muster sufficient Security Council support for a proposed
U.N. Security Council resolution that would have authorized force if Iraq did not
meet a final deadline for Iraq to fully comply with WMD disarmament mandates.
Policy Debate.  Several press accounts indicate that there have been divisions
within the Administration on Iraq policy.  Secretary of State Powell had been said to
typify those in the Administration who believed that a long term program of
unfettered weapons inspections could have succeeded in containing the WMD threat
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from Iraq.12  He reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the
United Nations to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm voluntarily.  However, since
late January 2003, Secretary Powell has insisted that Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully
with the  latest weapons inspections indicated that inspections would not succeed in
disarming Iraq and that war would be required, with or without U.N. authorization.
The Secretary is reportedly  highly critical in private of U.S. allies, particularly
France, that opposed  war with Iraq.  Some press reports on March 23, 2003,
indicated that Powell is in touch with senior officials of several of Iraq’s neighbors
to try to negotiate the exile of Saddam and his sons.  
Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, among others, were consistently skeptical that inspections could
significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in
favor of U.S. military action against Iraq.  These and other U.S. officials reportedly
believe that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way for democracy not
only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East and reduce support for terrorism.  In a
speech before the American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003, President
Bush said that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States could lead to
the spread of democracy in the Middle East and a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute. 
In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically
since the September 11, 2001 attacks that Iraq supports and has ties to the Al Qaeda
organization, among other terrorist groups.  According to the Administration, Iraq
has provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical
weapons, and senior Al Qaeda activists have contacts with the Baghdad regime.  A
faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-
Islam, is in contact with the Iraqi regime, according to the Administration.  That
enclave was attacked by U.S. forces shortly after the war began on March 19.
President Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union message that “Evidence from
intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements from people now in
custody, reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members
of Al Qaeda.”  However, press reports in early February 2003 said that this view was
not uniform within the intelligence community and that some in the intelligence
community discount any Iraq-Al Qaeda tie.
Another view is that there may have been occasional tactical cooperation
between some in Al Qaeda and some Iraq intelligence agents.13  Others are said to
believe that there might have been some cooperation when Osama bin Laden was
based in Sudan in the early 1990s, but that any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off
later on, after bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and went to Afghanistan.
Bin Laden issued a statement of solidarity with the Iraqi people on February 12,
exhorting them to resist any U.S. attack.  Secretary of State Powell cited the tape as
evidence of an alliance between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda, although bin Laden
CRS-7
was highly critical of Saddam Hussein in the statement, calling his Baath Party
regime “socialist” and therefore “infidel.”  
Regime Change Goal.  The Bush Administration’s September 2002 decision
to seek a  U.N. umbrella for the confrontation with Iraq led officials to mute their
prior declarations that the goal of U.S. policy was to change Iraq’s regime.  The
purpose of downplaying this goal may have been to blunt criticism from U.S. allies
and other countries that wanted to focus on the disarmament of Iraq and argued that
regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution.  However, in practice, the
United States drew little separation between regime change and disarmament: the
Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad would be required to
ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD.  In recent weeks, as the U.N. option
drew to a close, the Administration again stressed regime change as a specific goal
of a U.S.-led war, and some argue that the President’s ultimatum that Saddam and
his sons leave Iraq to avoid war indicates that the regime change goal is paramount.
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Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated March 21, 2003)
As the United States conducts Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the regime
of Saddam Hussein, Members of Congress have expressed their utmost support for
U.S. military forces in the region and for their families at home. On March 20, 2003,
the House of Representatives, by a vote of 392 in favor to 11 opposed,
overwhelmingly passed H.Con.Res. 104, a resolution that expressed the support and
appreciation of the nation for the President and the members of the armed forces who
are participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. That same day, the Senate passed a
similar resolution, S.Res. 95 by a vote of 99 - 0.  Nonetheless, some debate continues
over Administration diplomacy in connection with the war and the level of
consultation with Congress over the war’s costs.  Moreover, Congress will likely be
looking ahead to issues related to the rebuilding of Iraq. President Bush briefed
congressional leaders on the Administration’s Iraq policy several hours before his
March 17, 2003 televised speech to the nation. Since the beginning of the war,
Defense Department officials have been regularly briefing some Members of
Congress on the progress of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Background.  Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played
an active role in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force
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it into compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted
aid and trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international
sanctions against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s
regime from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place.  In
1991, Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces
from Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
(P.L. 102-1).
On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq.  The resolution conferred broad authority
on the President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.”  The resolution expressed
congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Congress continued to play a role in formulating U.S. policy in Iraq even after
the passage of H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243). The range of congressional action falls
roughly into four broad categories:
! Many Members who voted in favor of the resolution offered strong
support for President Bush’s attempts to force Iraq into compliance
with U.N. resolutions.
! Other lawmakers, including some who supported the resolution,
commended the Administration for applying pressure on Saddam
Hussein’s regime but have called on the Administration to be more
forthcoming with plans for the future of Iraq and more committed to
achieving the broadest possible international coalition of allied
countries.
! Still others, including some Members who voted in favor of H.J.Res.
114, questioned the urgency of dealing with Iraq, particularly in light
of developments in North Korea and Iran.
! Finally, many Members who voted against H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-
243) continued to look for ways to forestall the use of force against
Iraq, in part by proposing alternative resolutions that call for a more
comprehensive inspections process.  In one instance, several
Members initiated a lawsuit to curtail the President’s ability to
authorize the use of force.  (See below, International and Domestic
Legal Issues Relating to the Use of Force.)
Recent Legislation.  After the start of the 108th Congress, lawmakers drafted
several resolutions relating to the current confrontation with Iraq. Some Members
opposed to a war in Iraq proposed bills to repeal the “Authorization for Use of
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Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”14 Other lawmakers drafted
legislation that would require the President to meet additional criteria such as
allowing additional time for weapons inspections and passing a second U.N. Security
Council resolution before authorizing the use of force against Iraq.15 Even before
President Bush’s March 17 ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, most observers did not
expect these measures to be reported out of committee due to insufficient support.
Some Members of Congress have considered measures, such as trade sanctions,
that would retaliate against France and Germany for their stance on Iraq. U.S.
lawmakers, angry over French and German opposition to the Administration’s Iraq
policies, are considering retaliatory gestures such as trade sanctions against French
wine and bottled water. Some Members reportedly also support proposals to move
many U.S. troops based in Germany to other locations.16 One lawmaker has proposed
legislation that would prevent any post-conflict assistance funding from being
expended with a French-owned company.
Options for the Future. With Operation Iraqi Freedom in full swing, a
supplemental appropriations bill to provide funding is widely anticipated.  Following
the war and “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will likely seek to influence
future internal political and economic developments in that country. Congress may
be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance programs that would
facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq.  The extent and cost of U.S. programs
would depend on the post-war scenario. (See below, Cost Issues.)  The
Administration may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees or to support
coalition partners in the Middle East, which may suffer economically in the event of
regional instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of assistance
specific to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-
511), which authorized aid to the former Soviet Union, or the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress will have to
weigh Iraq-related aid against other budget priorities.
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(Last updated March 24, 2003)
The first 100 hours of the combat saw U.S. ground forces move within 100
miles of Baghdad, skirting urban areas and seizing only objectives key to continuing
the advance.  Pockets of resistance continue to be encountered, and Iraqi paramilitary
forces have undertaken guerrilla-style attacks in rear areas.  Though press reports
have made much of these encounters, U.S. military commanders generally consider
them to be the expected result of a rapid advance through hostile territory and
unlikely to impinge on the overall success of the campaign.  Relatively few casualties
have been incurred, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters
maintains that the ground offensive is “on schedule” and “on-track.”  Though the
more optimistic predictions of mass surrenders by Iraqi troops have not come to pass,
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a CENTCOM spokesman has noted that U.S. forces have encountered no “organized,
cohesive” resistance.  It is generally believed that the critical point will be when U.S.
ground forces engage Republican Guard units around Baghdad, and it appears that
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine units are grouping in preparation for these attacks now.
Some observers have voiced concern that U.S. forces may be being purposely drawn
in, over-extending their lines and making them more vulnerable to attacks in these
rear areas.  The air offensive continues unabated against a wide range of targets (e.g.
Republican Guard units, command and control centers, air defense sites).  The most
significant unknowns remain the extent and intensity of Iraqi resistance within
Baghdad and whether chemical or biological weapons will be employed.  To date
Iraqi forces have not employed chemical or biological weapons, and press reports to
the contrary, CENTCOM has not confirmed the discovery of any WMD sites.
CENTCOM commander General Franks has suggested that such discoveries may
well not occur until later in the campaign.
The United States continues its  build-up of military forces in the Persian Gulf
region and other locations within operational range of Iraq.  The Department of
Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these deployments; but
press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of the troop
movements underway.  The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted,  are not
confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.
The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore
and afloat) reportedly exceeds  250,000.  Additional units that have been alerted for
deployment, but have not begun transit, include the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st
Armored Division, and 1st Mechanized Division.  The 4th Mechanized Infantry
Division, originally intended to attack through Turkey, has been diverted to Kuwait.
Ships carrying its equipment are expected to arrive by early April, and its personnel
are to deploy by air from the United States.  The 101st Airborne (Air Assault)
Division has begun to deploy from Kuwait to positions within Iraq.  It is also
probable that some airborne troops (82nd Airborne Division and 173rd Airborne
Brigade) have moved into positions in northern Iraq.
DOD has announced that, as of March 19, 2003, more than 212,000 National
Guard and Reservists from all services are now called to active duty, an increase of
about 24,000 in one week.17  DOD has not indicated which of these personnel are
being deployed to the Persian Gulf region and how many will be “backfilling”
positions of active duty personnel in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. 
In addition to U.S. deployments, Britain has dispatched an armor Battle Group,
a naval Task Force (including Royal Marines), and Royal Air Force units, totaling
reportedly about 47,000 personnel.18  Australia has deployed approximately 2,000
personnel, primarily special operations forces.
The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf states
of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  Though
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there had been speculation about what level of cooperation/participation could  be
expected from these nations if the United Nations Security Council did not pass
another resolution specifically authorizing the use of force against Iraq, it currently
appears that they will continue to support U.S. military operations against Iraq.
Because  of significant popular opposition to this support in some countries,
governments have sought to minimize public acknowledgment of their backing.
There are press reports that U.S. forces, both ground and air, have also deployed to
Jordan and are mounting special operations  against Iraq from the west.19
Outside the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark,
Poland have offered combat force contributions.  Germany, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, and Ukraine have military nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) defense
teams in Kuwait, but these will not enter Iraq. After protracted debate, NATO’s
Defense Policy Committee approved Turkey’s request for military assistance and
directed NATO headquarters to begin the deployment of airborne early-warning
aircraft, air defense missiles, and chemical-biological defensive equipment.  Germany
and Belgium reversed their early opposition to this effort, and France’s anticipated
opposition was obviated by acting within the Defense Policy Committee, of which
France is not a member. Both the Netherlands and Germany have deployed Patriot
air defense missiles to Turkey. 
 The U.S. CENTCOM commander has downplayed the impact of the Turkish
parliament’s earlier rejection of a proposal for basing U.S. troops in Turkey, stating
that the use of Turkish territory is not necessary for a successful operation.
Nevertheless, CENTCOM has lost the advantage of having a second major front for
Iraqi armed forces to face early in the conflict.  Currently, northern Iraq remains
relatively uneventful militarily, with no large offensive operations yet undertaken.
There are still concerns about possibly large deployments of Turkish troops into the
region, and the United States continues talks with Turkey on this issue.  (See also
Diplomatic Issues  and Burden Sharing Issues.)
News reports maintain that the Bush Administration, through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and the National Strategy for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction,  has endorsed the possible first use of nuclear weapons if U.S.
or allied forces are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, or to attack
underground bunkers that are deemed invulnerable to conventional munitions.
Though shown to the press, NSPD 17 remains classified and Administration
spokesmen have declined comment on its content.  The National Strategy document
does not refer to nuclear weapons specifically but rather refers to a “resort to all
options.”  Some analysts suspect that press leaks on a nuclear option are an attempt
to intimidate Iraq rather than a genuine threat.  Critics are concerned that the
Administration is lowering the nuclear threshold and discarding long-held U.S.
assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power.20
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Diplomatic Issues
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661
(Last updated March 24, 2003)
The March 17, 2003 announcement by the United States, Britain, and Spain that
they were withdrawing their proposed “second resolution” at the United Nations
Security Council (see above, Background), was followed that evening by President
Bush’s nationwide address giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to flee or risk
military conflict.  These events marked the end of a major U.S. diplomatic effort to
win the support of a Security Council majority for action against Iraq without further
delay.  The end of the diplomatic phase of the confrontation with Iraq left a bitter
aftermath among some foreign opponents of the U.S. and British intervention.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that United Nations weapons inspectors
would have been able to complete the disarmament process peacefully,21 and after the
war was launched on March 19, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin charged that “This
military action cannot be justified in any way.”22  German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder said “A bad decision was taken: the choice of the logic of war has won
over the chances for peace.”23  French President Jacques Chirac, as expected, was
also highly critical.
Relations with European Allies.  Whether the United States should attempt
to mend relations with European allies who have been critics of U.S. policy on Iraq
will likely emerge as a diplomatic issue in coming months.  Some see little value in
doing so on grounds that the capabilities of these countries for contributing to global
threat reduction are limited.  Moreover, these observers note, other European
countries, particularly Britain and Spain, have backed U.S. actions in Iraq, reducing
the impact of French, German, and Russian opposition.  (For support offered by other
countries, see below, Burden Sharing Issues.)  Finally, there is concern that
President Chirac may see it as the role of France and the European Union (EU) to
“balance” and constrain U.S. power, so that any U.S. move to compromise with
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European critics could play into this objective and damage U.S. interests.24  The
counter-view is that the controversy over Iraq has placed great strains on the United
Nations, NATO, and the European Union – international institutions that many see
as important components of global stability in the years ahead.  From this
perspective, healing relations with European critics of the United States can reduce
tensions within these organizations and help them to recover.25  Some also note that
a major EU contribution to the recovery of Iraq is more likely if U.S. relations with
Germany and France improve.  These two countries are central EU financial backers.
Those who favor greater understanding of European positions point out that many
European countries have significant Muslim populations and see developments in the
nearby Middle East as directly affecting their security interests.  
A test of the likely future of U.S. relations with France, Germany, and Russia
could soon occur at the United Nations Security Council.  President Chirac has
argued that only the United Nations can legitimately administer post-war Iraq, and
has opposed a proposal by Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain for a Security
Council resolution authorizing a British/American administration.26  U.S. officials
are hoping that the United Nations will play a key role in humanitarian relief efforts
in Iraq,27 but this could be jeopardized if France and Russia, who have veto power at
the Security Council, remain uncooperative.
Use of Diplomatic Instruments in Support of the War.  With the onset
of war, the United States asked countries having diplomatic relations with Iraq to
close Iraqi embassies, freeze their assets, and expel Iraqi diplomats.  U.S. officials
argued that the regime in Iraq would soon change and that the new government
would be appointing new ambassadors.  Press reports suggest that while Australia did
expel Iraqi diplomats,  the U.S. request met with little success elsewhere; and several
countries explicitly refused.28  On March 20, 2003, President Bush issued an
executive order confiscating Iraqi assets, frozen since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990, for use for humanitarian purposes.  The United States asked other countries
holding Iraqi assets to do the same, but this request too seems to have met with a
limited response to date.29  
U.S. policymakers are concerned that Turkey might send a large number of
troops into northern Iraq and are applying diplomatic pressure to prevent this from
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happening.  President Bush warned Turkey not to come into northern Iraq on March
24, and U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalizad met with Turkish leaders on March 24
to emphasize the point.30  Turkey fears that any drive by Iraqi Kurds toward
independence would encourage Kurdish separatists in Turkey, but fighting between
Turks and Kurds in northern Iraq would greatly complicate U.S. efforts to stabilize
the country.  Finally, the U.S. government has delivered a protest to the government
of Russia for failing to prevent Russian firms from selling military equipment to Iraq
in violation of United Nations sanctions.  The sales reportedly included electronic
jamming equipment and night vision goggles.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated March 24, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-
range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the justifications put
forward for forcibly disarming Iraq.  At present, the most pressing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) issues are related to possible use by Iraqi forces of WMD,
potential U.S. military strikes against WMD-related facilities, and plans for
eliminating residual capabilities during and after the war.  Some key questions to
consider include:
! What deployable WMD forces does Iraq have?  What are their plans
for using WMD?
! Is intelligence adequate for U.S. military forces to target WMD
capabilities?
! What are the possible health and environmental effects of destroying
WMD or WMD production sites?
! How might U.S. forces prevent the transfer of WMD technologies
or capabilities to unknown entities in the immediate aftermath of the
war? 
Iraq’s Deployable Weapons of Mass Destruction.  On March 17, 2003,
media first reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had information that Iraq was
deploying chemical weapons (CW) with troops.  A March 20 report in the Wall Street
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Journal went further, citing Pentagon officials that “intelligence reports suggested
Hussein has given field-level commanders clearance to use chemical weapons and
biological weapons.”31 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told CBS’s Face The Nation
that Iraqi forces “have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed
them, and that they are weaponized, and that, in one case at least, that the command
and control arrangements have been established.”  Nonetheless, there is currently no
reliable information about how many chemical or biological weapons Iraq might
have ready for deployment, or what the plans for their use may be.  Many assume
there are such weapons in Iraq now and many also assume that Iraq has ballistic
missiles with ranges longer than the U.N.-mandated 93mi/150km limit.  Although
press reports have mentioned that Iraq has fired medium-range missiles, this has not
yet been verified.  Few observers assume that Iraq has radiological or nuclear
weapons that could be deployed.
Iraq’s delivery vehicles for chemical and biological weapons (BW) are relatively
limited, according to most observers.  Iraq is thought to have a couple of dozen
SCUD missiles (with a 400-mile range), which can carry only a relatively small
payload and are extremely inaccurate.  Iraq also could use short-range rockets and
artillery with biological and chemical munitions, but given the overwhelming U.S.
airpower superiority, these are likely to be eliminated soon after they are spotted.
Similarly, unmanned aerial vehicles armed with CW or BW, according to one report,
“would make easy targets for U.S. fighter jets.”32  
Some observers have looked to Iraq’s 1991 capabilities as a benchmark for what
Iraq might have now.  Back then, Iraq had deployable biological and chemical
weapons and missiles, but no nuclear weapons.  According to UNMOVIC, Iraq had
thousands of short range rockets, artillery shells and bombs, and hundreds of tons of
bulk agent at the time of the Gulf War.33  Iraq had also produced 50 warheads to be
filled with nerve agent for use with Al-Hussein missiles.  Although Iraq did not use
chemical weapons against U.S. and allied forces in the 1991 Gulf War, it had used
chemical weapons extensively in the Iran-Iraq War.34  The biological weapons
program was not as far advanced in 1991, but at that time, Iraq had filled 25 Al-
Hussein warheads and 157 R0-400 aerial bombs with anthrax, botulinum toxin, and
aflatoxin and deployed them to four locations.  Iraq also did not use those biological
weapons in the 1991 Gulf War.  There is some concern that Iraq may have developed
more sophisticated delivery systems for BW and CW recently.  The discovery of
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cluster munitions in late February by U.N. inspectors may point to this
development.35
A key question is why and how Iraq would use WMD against U.S. forces.
Although not used by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, some analysts believe that Saddam
Hussein might be tempted to use WMD if his regime were threatened, which is an
explicit goal of the current war.  According to Charles Duelfer, a former UNSCOM
deputy, high-ranking Iraqi officers told him that chemical weapons would have been
used in 1991 if U.S. forces kept going to Baghdad.36  Most military analysts believe
that Iraq’s use of WMD would be effective to instill fear and to slow a U.S. attack
but would not reap battlefield advantages or cause the kinds of casualties they did in
the Iran-Iraq war.
Targeting WMD and WMD sites.  During the 1991 Gulf War, significant
portions of Iraq’s WMD and WMD capabilities were destroyed through airstrikes and
later through destruction by ground forces.  Iraq’s chemical weapons and missile
capabilities were well known to coalition forces.  According to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Gulf War ... devastated Iraq’s primary CW
production facilities and a large portion of its stockpile of CW munitions.”37  After
the war, inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents,
and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals, leaving in question the fate of about
31,600 chemical munitions, 500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical
precursors.
The 1991 Gulf War air strikes also destroyed much of the infrastructure
supporting Iraq’s ballistic missile program, including major industrial facilities that
supported the program.  Of the ten major facilities, five were bombed in the Gulf
War and three more were targeted during the 1998 Desert Fox operation.  Of the 819
ballistic missiles Iraq declared in 1991, more than half (516) were expended against
Iran prior to the Gulf War; about 93 were destroyed in the Gulf War, another 85
destroyed by Iraq, and 48 destroyed by U.N. inspectors afterward.  As reported
widely, coalition forces were unable to target mobile missile launchers in 1991.
Air strikes in 1991 destroyed a smaller percentage of Iraq’s nuclear and
biological weapons programs, because these programs were not as well known at that
time.  For instance, 1991 air strikes damaged or destroyed the known nuclear sites
(Al-Tuwaitha and uranium processing sites) but only lightly bombed the nuclear
weapons design headquarters, Al-Atheer, which was only discovered later.
Centrifuge-related sites were not bombed.  With regard to biological weapons, there
were eight BW-related facilities at the time of the Gulf War; only two were bombed
(and two others later became inactive).  UNSCOM inspectors destroyed the Al-
Hakam facility in 1996, and Operation Desert Fox targeted other sites.
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It is unclear whether U.S. air forces are targeting WMD facilities, but there
appear to be incentives for U.S. forces to preserve evidence rather than destroy it
immediately.  In addition to supporting the rationale for war against Iraq, corralling
WMD capabilities could help limit the environmental and health consequences and
help control against possible terrorist acquisition in a situation of chaotic destruction.
The Department of Defense has assembled disarmament teams to hunt on the ground
in Iraq for WMD.  These teams include former UNSCOM inspectors, civilians from
the Department of Energy and Justice, and military personnel. According to one
source, the teams will not be “blowing up munitions and destroying things if they do
not pose an immediate threat.  We will secure it and then come back, when we’re in
a permissive environment, to destroy the material in a way that’s safe to civilians and
soldiers.”38  In addition, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has issued
a 170-page booklet to U.S. ground forces with information on identifying WMD
facilities, vehicles, equipment, key components and possible hazards.  Most pages
of the booklet contain a variation on the admonition “Do not disturb or destroy.”  On
March 23, U.S. special forces took over a large industrial facility near the city of
Najal, which is being investigated to determine if it produces chemicals for chemical
weapons.39
Possible Health and Environmental Effects.  The destruction of Iraqi
biological or chemical weapons by U.S. and coalition forces could have health and
environmental consequences for U.S. troops and Iraqis, but it is impossible to predict
the impact because there are so many variables.  Some variables to consider include
what kind of WMD is present (e.g., biological weapons pose fewer problems in
destruction than chemical weapons, because dispersal is less likely and they do not
require such high temperatures for destruction); how the material or weapons are
stored; how much control can be exerted over the destruction; and geographic,
geological, and temporal circumstances.  Probably the greatest chance for minimizing
health/environmental impact lies in controlled destruction, where the time and place
and method of destruction could be chosen.  Presumably, this would take place on
the ground and not necessarily during the war, but shortly thereafter.  During the war,
the impact could vary depending on what kind of ordnance is used and whether it is
destroyed from the air or on the ground.  
Although WMD capabilities in Iraq have been bombed before, during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Desert Fox in 1998, there have been few
assessments of the health and environmental impact of destroying WMD and WMD
materials.  In some instances, U.N. inspectors conducted ad hoc assessments to
determine the safety of their own inspectors.  For example, the IAEA measured
radioactivity levels at Al-Tuwaitha, a nuclear facility bombed during the 1991 war
to determine if it was safe enough to inspect.  A more critical circumstance is the
possible inadvertent destruction of WMD by U.S. ground forces.  During the 1991
Gulf War, U.S. and coalition forces destroyed warehouses that contained chemical
warheads.  The Khamisiyah site, for example,  was bombed over six days and after
the ceasefire, ground forces began destroying munitions.  These incidents were
investigated by the Department of Defense, which issued a final report in April
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2002.40  The report noted that “In the Gulf War, soldiers’ training included
identifying potential chemical weapons by their distinctive markings or physical
characteristics,” and that “Properly employed, chemical warfare agent detection
equipment possibly can prevent the accidental destruction of munitions containing
chemical warfare agents.”  According to one report, the United States’ nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) units “have made major advancements since the
Persian Gulf War of 1991,” when Czech NBC units detected sarin and mustard gas,
but American detection units could not verify the results.41 
Preventing Transfer of WMD to Terrorists.  Iraq’s alleged support of
terrorism is one of the justifications put forward for disarming Iraq quickly.
Although there is no evidence either in the past or the present for Iraq sharing its
WMD technologies, capabilities, or materials with terrorists, there is also no
guarantee that this could not happen.  Media have reported that U.S. warplanners
likely will want to encircle and guard key WDM sites rather than destroy them,
primarily to obtain evidence of Iraq’s WMD, but this approach could also help
prevent the transfer of capabilities by keeping facilities and personnel intact.  Chaos,
such as was predicted during the fall of the Soviet Union, could provide opportunities
for those seeking WMD capabilities.
Role for U.N. Inspectors?  As U.N. staff (about 200) left Iraq on March 18,
UNMOVIC’s Executive Chairman  Dr. Hans Blix expressed disappointment at the
unfinished job of the inspectors.  At that time, he noted that the U.N. had not been
asked to help verify whatever WMD U.S. forces might uncover; other media reports
that the White House specifically decided to exclude UNMOVIC and the IAEA.42 
From November 2002 to March 2003, UNMOVIC and the IAEA conducted
approximately  750 inspections at 550 sites.  Those inspections uncovered relatively
little: empty chemical weapons shells not previously declared; two complete R-400
aerial bombs at a site where Iraq unilaterally destroyed BW-filled aerial bombs; 2,000
pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a private home; undeclared
remotely piloted vehicles with wing spans of 7.5 meters; and cluster bombs that
could be used with chemical or biological agents.  As a result of the inspections,
however, Iraq destroyed 70 (of a potential 100-120) Al-Samoud-2 missiles.  The
most comprehensive list of unresolved disarmament issues was outlined in the draft
document Dr. Blix presented to the Security Council on March 7,  Unresolved
Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programs.43  
It remains to be seen whether an ongoing inspection regime would still be
required in a post-war Iraq.  At a minimum, the IAEA will conduct inspections per
Iraq’s nuclear safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  A
post-Hussein Iraq might consent to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention, but there are no equivalent international inspection regimes for
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biological weapons or missiles at present.44  The world community’s confidence in
Iraq’s disarmament, and hence, the necessity for an ongoing monitoring regime, may
depend on the level of verifiable disarmament during and after the war, and on the
assurances of the future leaders of Iraq.
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The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation and instability in a post-Saddam
Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations have been present in the recent debate over
Iraq policy.  One of the concerns cited by the George H.W. Bush Administration for
ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-Saddam Iraq could
dissolve into chaos.  It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims, the majority but
under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal factions, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Because of the complexities of various post-war risks to stability in Iraq and the
region, some observers believe that Iraq might most effectively be governed by a
military or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to democracy but
would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions.  Administration statements,
however, continue to express a strong commitment to democratizing Iraq. 
Current Planning Efforts.  The Administration asserts that it will do what
is necessary to bring about a stable, democratic successor regime that complies with
all applicable U.N. resolutions.  Senior State Department and  Defense Department
officials testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11,
2003 that there would likely be at least a 2-year period before governance of Iraq
could be transferred from the U.S. military to an Iraqi administration.45  However,
some Iraqi opposition figures who have met with Administration officials in mid-
March 2003 said that the Administration might be leaning toward a more rapid
turnover to an Iraqi interim administration than was initially planned, particularly if
U.S. occupation forces encounter resistance and take heavy casualties.  The Chief of
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Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee
on February 24 that as many as 200,000 U.S. troops might be needed for a postwar
occupation, although other Administration officials have disputed the Shinseki
assessment.
U.S. officials have said that Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) would direct U.S. civilian
occupation forces, which are to include U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government
personnel serving as advisers and administrators in Iraq’s various ministries.  Cable
News Network reported on March 7, 2003 that the Administration plans to
administer post-war Iraq by appointing one administrator each for a northern,
southern, and a central region.  During the interim period, the United States would
eliminate remaining WMD, eliminate terrorist cells in Iraq, begin economic
reconstruction, and purge Baath Party leaders.  Iraq’s oil industry would also be
rebuilt and upgraded.
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-
war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States.  The opposition groups that have been
active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they
are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand
power to those who have been part of the current regime.  For now, the
Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional
government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists.  Nonetheless, the opposition met in
northern Iraq in late February 2003, with White House special envoy Zalmay
Khalilzad attending,  to plan their involvement in a post-Saddam regime.  On
February 11, Iraqi exile opposition leaders reiterated their strong opposition to the
installation of a U.S. military governor in post-war Iraq46 and against U.S. urging, the
opposition has named a six-man council that is to prepare for a transition government
if and when Saddam Hussein is ousted.  The six are Iraqi National Congress director
Ahmad Chalabi; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani; Kurdistan
Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani; Shiite Muslim leader Mohammad Baqr Al
Hakim, who heads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI);
Iraq National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi foreign minister Adnan
Pachachi.
Some believe that of the opposition groups, SCIRI is the best organized and can
draw on support from its patrons in Iran.  SCIRI controls militia units called the
“Badr Brigades,” which are reportedly supported by Iran’s highly motivated
Revolutionary Guard and have been active against Iraqi forces in southern Iraq for
the past decade.  In early March 2003, some Badr Brigade fighters entered northern
Iraq, far from their traditional base in the south, possibly to position themselves to
seize a share of power in cities in northern and central Iraq.  Others believe that there
are ex-military officers who might rally remnants of the Iraqi armed forces into a new
U.S.-backed Sunni Muslim-dominated regime.  
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As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is
reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are
meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor
government.47  The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; and (7) economy and infrastructure.  Phase two, which began in late 2002,
includes working groups on (8) education; (9) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
and migration policy; (10) foreign and national security policy; (11) defense
institutions and policy; (12) free media; (13) civil society capacity-building; (14) anti-
corruption measures; (15) oil and energy; (16) preserving Iraq’s cultural heritage; and
(17) local government.  It is not yet known what influence, if any, these working
groups will  have on any post-war regime decision-making in Iraq.  
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects.  On January 20, 2003, President
Bush ordered the formation of post-war planning office called the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, within the Department of  Defense.
The office is in the process of establishing links with U.N. agencies and non-
governmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq and forge links to
counterpart organizations in countries that participate in U.S. military action against
Iraq. 
 
It is widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those
of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund reconstruction.  Presidential spokesman Ari
Fleischer said on February 18, 2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a
variety of means ... to shoulder much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.”
Many observers have been concerned that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat
could destroy its own oil fields.  Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire before withdrawing
from there in 1991, but coalition forces say they have secured Iraq’s southern oil
fields since combat began on March 19, 2003, and only about 9 oil wells were set on
fire, of a total of over 500 oil fields in that region. The northern oil fields in Kirkuk
and Mosul have not yet been captured by coalition forces, but there are no reports any
are afire in those areas.  
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves.  Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.  Some press reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such
control,48 although some observers speculate that the Administration had sought to
create such an impression in order to persuade Russia to support use of force against
Iraq. 
 
War Crimes Trials.  Analysts have debated whether Saddam Hussein and his
associates should be prosecuted for war crimes.  In late 2002, the Administration
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reportedly had reached a consensus that Saddam and his inner circle would be tried
in Iraq.49  The Administration has been gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam
and 12 of his associates, including his two sons Uday and Qusay.  The U.S.
ultimatum delivered March 17 is limited to Saddam and the two sons, leaving it
unclear whether the Administration will consider other members of his inner circle
as war criminals if they are captured in the course of the war.  The New York Times
reports that U.S. intelligence has catalogued and categorized about 2,000 members
of the Iraqi elite, segmenting them into those that might be tried as war criminals,
those that might quickly defect to the U.S. side in the event of war, and those that
already could be considered opposed to Saddam or whose expertise would be crucial
to running post-war Iraq.50
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In November 2002, the U.S. government reportedly contacted the governments
of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq.  On March 18,
2003, the Administration released a list of 30 countries that have publicly stated their
support for U.S. efforts to disarm Iraq, and Secretary of State Powell said that 15
other countries were giving private backing; four days later, the number of countries
publicly providing a range of types of support had grown to 46.51  Nevertheless, only
three countries have supplied ground combat troops in significant numbers– in
contrast to the 1991 Gulf war when more than 30 countries provided military support
or to the 2002 campaign in Afghanistan, when 21 sent armed forces.52
Political and Military Factors.  On the international political front, analysts
contend that it is important for the United States to enlist allies in order to
demonstrate that it is not acting unilaterally – that its use of force to disarm Iraq has
been endorsed by a broad global coalition.  Although the political leaders of some
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Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush Administration’s aims, they
must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their populations.  Analysts have
suggested that some countries have sided with the United States out of mixed
motives; former U.S. ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter characterized the nations
backing U.S. policy as “a coalition of the convinced, the concerned, and the co-
opted.”53
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation is not critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the
United States initially relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only
small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries.  Allied combat
and peacekeeping forces arrived in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been
defeated.  Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because
the unique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating
and then calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the
utmost speed in command and communications.54  An opposing view is that the
United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for
an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism.  However, during Operation
Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-makers complained that the
requirement for allied consensus hampered the military campaign with a time-
consuming bombing target approval process.  Another military rationale for having
primarily U.S. forces conduct operations against Iraq is that few other countries
possess the military capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air lift, precision guided
munitions, and night vision equipment) necessary for a high-tech campaign designed
to achieve a swift victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.
Direct and Indirect Contributions.  Britain, the only other country that had
warplanes patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq, has sent or committed 45,000 ground
troops, as well as air and naval forces, and Australia has committed 2,000 special
forces troops, naval vessels, and fighter aircraft.  Poland and South Korea are
contributing 200 and 700 noncombat personnel, respectively, and Spain and
Denmark have sent warships.  Several countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine – have pledged contingents of anti-
chemical and -biological weapons specialists.55  In response to Washington’s request,
Romania has dispatched non-combat troops (engineers, medics and military police),
and about 1,000 U.S. personnel have been stationed in ConstanÛa, which is acting as
an “air bridge” to the Persian Gulf.  Japan, constitutionally barred from dispatching
ground troops, reportedly may also help in the disposal of chemical and biological
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weapons, and has recently reinforced its fleet of naval vessels patrolling the Indian
Ocean.56  
Other forms of support are also valuable.  For example, countries have granted
overflight rights or back-filled for U.S. forces that might redeploy to Iraq from
Central Asia or the Balkans:  Canada is sending nearly 3,000 troops to Afghanistan,
freeing up U.S. soldiers for Iraq.  In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes
from countries close to Iraq reduces the need for mid-air refueling, allow aircraft to
re-arm sooner, and  enable planes to respond more quickly to ground force calls for
air strikes; several countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Spain, Italy,
Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria are allowing the use of their airbases and seaports.
At the Bush Administration’s request, the Hungarian government is allowing the use
of an air base for the training of up to 3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist
coalition forces as non-combatant interpreters and administrators.57 
On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of
assistance from the NATO allies, such as AWACS, refueling, and overflight
privileges; the request was deferred.  On February 10, France, Germany and Belgium
vetoed U.S. and Turkish requests to bolster Turkish defenses on the grounds that it
would implicitly endorse an attack on Iraq; German Chancellor Schroeder sought to
sharpen the distinction by announcing that his government would provide defensive
missiles and AWACS crews to help protect Turkey on a bilateral basis.  The impasse
was broken by an agreement over language indicating that such assistance “relates
only to the defense of Turkey” and does not imply NATO support for a military
operation against Iraq.58  Despite the compromise, many observers believe the
temporary rift may have lasting consequences for NATO.
The Bush Administration asked permission of the Turkish government to use
Turkish bases and ports and to move American troops through southeast Turkey to
establish a northern front against Iraq–a key issue for U.S. planners.  The negotiations
over troop access proceeded in tandem with discussions over a U.S. aid package.59
An initial agreement was struck, permitting 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey; in return,
the United States was to provide $6 billion in assistance.  On March 1, however, the
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Turkish parliament by a 3-vote margin failed to approve the deal.  Prime Minister
Erdogan urged Washington to wait, but by March 18, the U.S. military cargo vessels
that had been standing anchored off the Turkish coast were steaming toward the
Gulf.60  On March 20, the Turkish parliament authorized flyover rights for the
coalition and also agreed to dispatch Turkish troops into northern Iraq, a move
opposed by the United States and other countries.  Some Members of Congress and
other U.S. policymakers have criticized Turkey, claiming it sought to leverage U.S.
strategic needs to squeeze a large aid package out of Washington.  However, Turkish
officials argue that more than 90% of their country’s population opposes a war and
that Turkey suffered severe economic losses from the 1991 Gulf War.  Ankara also
is concerned over the possibility that the Iraq conflict could re-kindle the efforts of
Kurdish separatists to carve out a Kurdish state.  Finally, Turkey has sought
assurances that Iraq’s 2-3 million ethnic Turkmen will be able to play a post-war role
in Iraq.61
In late February 2003, Jordan’s prime minister acknowledged the presence of
several hundred U.S. military personnel on Jordanian soil; the troops were reportedly
there to operate Patriot missile defense systems and to conduct search-and-rescue
missions; the deployment marked a reversal from Jordan’s neutral stance during the
1991 Gulf war.62  Egypt is permitting the U.S. military to use its airspace and the
Suez Canal.  Although the Persian Gulf states generally opposed an attack on Iraq in
public statements, between 225,000 and 280,000 U.S. military personnel are ashore
or afloat in the region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command
centers; according to recent reports, the Saudi government has sanctioned limited use
of the Prince Sultan airbase command center and will permit search-and-rescue
operations to be conducted along the Saudi-Iraqi border.  The Saudis also have
pledged to step up their oil output to compensate for any drop in Iraqi production.
Kuwait is serving as the launch pad for the U.S.-led ground attack against Iraq.  In
addition, five U.S. aircraft carriers are in the region.
Post-Conflict Assistance.  After the 1991 Gulf War, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq.  However, U.S. policymakers hope that many countries will
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
peacekeeping forces.  Several countries, including France, Japan, Sweden, Russia,
and Romania have indicated that they might play a role.
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Implications for the Middle East
Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626
(Last updated March 24, 2003)
The current U.S.-led military campaign to disarm Iraq and end the regime of
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could have widespread effects on the broader Middle
East. Demographic pressures, stagnant economic growth, questions over political
succession, and festering regional disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding
the future of the Middle East. Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might
fragment along ethnic or sectarian lines as a by-product of the war, a redrawing of
regional boundaries as occurred after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War
II) is highly unlikely; however, political realignments could take place, along with
new alliances and rivalries that might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the
region.
The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might
increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even
more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals.  Middle East governments
providing support to the U.S. effort against Iraq are doing so with minimal publicity
and will expect to be rewarded with financial assistance, political support, or both,
in the war’s aftermath.  In some cases, even the promise of increased aid has been
insufficient to obtain support for U.S. military operations against Iraq.  Turkey, a
long-standing U.S. ally, appears to have forfeited a proposed U.S. aid package when
the Turkish parliament did not approve a U.S. request for U.S. troops to pass through
Turkish territory en route to Iraq.
Democracy and Governance.  Some commentators believe that the war
with Iraq, if it culminates in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, will lead to a
democratic revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration
itself has repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic
order in the Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region
have authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader
effort to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world
in economic and social spheres, as well as in individual freedom and political
empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
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In his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17, 2003, President Bush commented
that after Saddam departs from the scene, the Iraqi people “can set an example to all
the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.”  The President
promised that the United States would work for liberty and peace in the Middle East
region.
Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and
compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often
charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt
regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in
the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle
East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for
key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained
in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort
to support democratization and development, although the Administration is
requesting significantly more funding for this initiative–$145 million–in FY2004.
Arab reactions to the Powell initiative tended to be cool, some arguing that the
United States should deal with Arab-Israeli issues first. Still others fear that more
open political systems could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups,
who often constitute the most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other
groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, some are concerned
that lack of prior experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic
institutions in the Middle East.
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. Administration officials and other commentators
argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more favorable climate
for future initiatives to resume currently stalled Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.
Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush Administration, which
brought Arabs and Israelis together in a landmark peace conference at Madrid in
1991, after first disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Many believe that the
then Bush Administration secured wide Arab participation in the coalition to expel
Iraq from Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to address the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Officials of the present Bush Administration continue to speak of their
vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after eliminating current threats
from Iraq. In a statement to the press on March 14, 2003, President Bush affirmed
that “America is committed, and I am personally committed, to implementing our
road map toward peace” between Arabs and Israelis.
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to U.S. interests than Iraq.
They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led coalition against Iraq
is far weaker than it was in 1991, and argue that cooperation from Arab and Muslim
states will remain limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli issues continue to
fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate in Arab-Israeli
negotiations, combined with the war against Iraq, runs the risk of inflaming popular
opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in anti-U.S. terrorism.
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region.  Large-scale deployment of
U.S. troops to the Middle East to wage war against Iraq and the likelihood of a
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continued major U.S. military presence in the region will exert added pressures on
Middle East governments to accommodate U.S. policies in the near term. However,
some fear that long-lasting major U.S. military commitments in the region, could
heighten resentment against the United States from Islamic fundamentalists,
nationalists, and other groups opposed to a U.S. role in the Middle East; such
resentment could manifest itself in sporadic long-term terrorism directed against U.S.
interests in the region. Even friendly Middle East countries may eventually seek a
reduction in U.S. military presence.  According to a Washington Post report on
February 9, 2003, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah plans to request the
withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Saudi territory after Iraq has been disarmed.
U.S. and Saudi officials declined to comment on this report, which an unnamed
White House official described as “hypothetical.”  Periodic dissension within the
Arab world could also affect future security arrangements in the Middle East,
particularly any arrangements involving the United States.63
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With the start of war on March 19, 2003 the humanitarian situation in Iraq
shifted into a new phase.  Earlier, there were reports of Kurdish civilians either
leaving cities located in possible combat zones or safeguarding their homes with
sheets of plastic in the event of a chemical attack by Hussein.  In Baghdad, civilians
bought water and canned food, converted currency, and filled gas tanks in preparation
for war.  On March 18, the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan authorized an
immediate withdrawal of United Nations (U.N.) personnel from Iraq and suspended
the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP).64  As the bombing campaign got underway, there
were reports of civilian casualties in Baghdad.  Internal population movements
continued mainly in the north.  Third Country Nationals (TCNs) represented the main
bulk of individuals leaving Iraq.
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Background.  It is widely believed that the current humanitarian situation
inside Iraq will worsen as a result of the war, though to what degree will depend on
the nature and duration of the conflict and the extent and quality of humanitarian
assistance.  It is anticipated that problems could arise from malnutrition and
disruption of food supplies, inadequate sanitation and clean water, and reduced health
and medical care.  The impact of the war in Iraq could also include a potential
humanitarian emergency with population movements across borders or within Iraq
itself. Although any predictions are highly speculative, before the war began, the
United Nations reportedly expected that 600,000 to 1.45 million refugees and asylum
seekers might flee Iraq, 2 to 3 million could become internally displaced, and 4.5
to10 million inside Iraq (nearly 40% of the Iraqi population) could  require food
assistance within weeks.65  Some argued that supplies of water, food, medicine, and
electricity were already a matter of urgent concern.66 
Until it was suspended, U.N. and other humanitarian agencies were providing
aid to Iraq through the OFFP, which used revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and
medicines for the civilian population.67  Since 1996, the OFFP has alleviated some
of the worst effects of the sanctions, but there is great dependence on government
services.  Iraq’s population is estimated to be between 24 and 27 million people, of
which 60% have been receiving monthly food distributions under the OFFP.  Sources
say that families cannot make their rations last the full month or they need to sell part
of them for other necessities – leaving many people without any food stored in
reserve and more vulnerable.  Most of the warehouses that store food in OFFP are
now empty, which means there are few reserves within Iraq.  Reportedly,
Administration officials have indicated that once the military gains control, the OFFP
will be restarted.  
Contingency Planning.  War is disrupting critical infrastructure, delivery of
basic services, and food distribution. Aid organizations have been planning for
humanitarian needs amid great uncertainty about conditions in the aftermath of
conflict.  They report that emergency supplies such as water, food, medicine, shelter
materials, and hygiene kits are in place in countries bordering Iraq. Some are
concerned that there is still a lack of resources available to help refugees.  There are
also concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they
can provide adequately for these populations, and the impact of refugee flows on
stability in the region.  Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have
all publicly stated that they will prevent refugees from entering their countries,
although each continues to make preparations for assistance either within Iraq’s
borders or at transit areas at border crossing points.
On January 20, 2003, a presidential directive established the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in the Pentagon to prepare for war and
CRS-31
68 General Garner arrived in Kuwait on March 18 to oversee the potential postwar Iraq
effort.
69 “U.S. Military Lays Out Postwar Iraq Plan,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003.
post-war aid needs.  The Office, headed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, is
set up under the Department of Defense (DOD) but staffed by officials from agencies
throughout the U.S. government, including the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the State Department.  Civilian coordinators
in charge of three substantive areas – humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and civil
administration – and a fourth coordinator, responsible for communications, logistics,
and budgetary support, are expected to work on the planning and implementation of
assistance programs.68  The Pentagon has stated that humanitarian agencies may not
have access to all of Iraq immediately. According to planners, U.S. armed forces will
initially take the lead in relief and reconstruction, later turning to Iraqi ministries,
NGOs, and international organizations to assume some of the burden.69 Since
October 2002, USAID has also been putting together a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) and is making preparations to deal with the basic needs of one million
people.  The United States has 2.9 million humanitarian daily rations in place.
U.N. agencies have met with key donors  to develop possible humanitarian
scenarios and contingency plans, including the World Food Program (WFP), the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health
Organization (WHO), established as head of the health coordination group, United
Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM).  U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Ramiro Lopez da Silva,
has set up an interim logistics hub in Cyprus.  The WFP has enough food to feed 2
million people for one month.  Although NGOs have also been putting together
plans, the absence of international organizations and NGOs operating in and around
Iraq means there are few networks in place and there is little experience on the
ground. 
Operational Status: Latest Developments.  The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the lead agency inside Iraq.  In Baghdad, ICRC teams
have visited the main hospitals to see approximately 100 wounded and provide
additional medical supplies.  Doctors Without Borders is also set up in Baghdad.
Civilian casualties have been reported by the Iraqi health minister and on Al Jazeera
TV, but none have been confirmed to date.  ICRC staff also continued to monitor the
quality and quantity of drinking water. In Basrah, the ICRC team restored clean water
to approximately 40% of the city.  In Kirkuk, emergency supplies were provided to
aid agencies assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs).  In northern Iraq, the ICRC
continued to monitor the condition of the IDPs and provided emergency and non-aid
items to displaced families.  
Limited or no access by the United Nations and aid agencies makes it difficult
to confirm reports of population displacement.  According to the United Nations,
checkpoints between the three northern governorates and government of Iraq
controlled areas remained closed, limiting population movements; some reports
estimate 5,000 people may have moved north.  Unconfirmed numbers of IDPs within
the north were estimated by some to be as high as 300,000 to 450,000, but 90% of
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these were able to find local accommodation with friends and relatives.  There are
concerns that the Turkish-Iraqi border region is highly inaccessible for distribution
of food aid.  Few, if any refugees were moving out of Iraq, although some people
were gathering close to the Iraq/Iran border in the south. The security situation
remained stable over the weekend. 
Asylum seekers have been reported at several border areas, but there were no
confirmed arrivals.  Third country nationals (TCNs) are authorized to cross the
border shared by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  It has been reported that 1,200 Egyptians
crossed already with an additional 500 more expected.  Moroccans and Yemenis also
appear to be entering Syria.  Others, including Sudanese, Malians, Eritreans,
Djiboutians, and Somalians, have been trying to flee through Jordan.  IOM and the
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
are providing assistance to TCNs at the borders and helping them with preparations
for their onward journey to their home countries.
Relief Planning.  Almost no humanitarian aid has reached inside Iraq since
the war began.  Military operations and logistical problems  in the south have made
it too dangerous to open supply routes and the situation on the ground is not secure
enough for aid agencies to move in.  Lack of water, food, and electricity is proving
to be a problem for many Iraqis, and it is unclear when supplies will arrive.
Moreover, looting and lawlessness on the one hand combined with bitterness towards
the coalition forces on the other present additional problems.  Once security is
established, questions remain about delivery of aid and whether roads used by the
military will be usable or whether separate supply routes will need to be put in place.
The availability of cargo and water trucks (currently in short supply) are another
concern; as is the distribution of relief, particularly in cities where the military is not
gaining full control over population centers as they push north and keep the offensive
moving towards Baghdad.
The now coalition-controlled Port Umm Qasr, Iraq’s main outlet to the Persian
Gulf, is a crucial gateway for humanitarian supplies.  British forces are sweeping it
for mines and hoping to open it by midweek.  However, massive dredging and
rebuilding is required to prepare the port for large cargo ships.  In the meantime,
offloading is slow and inefficient, and risks delay in the delivery and distribution of
relief materials. 
DOD has clearly stated that it is not the lead agency for humanitarian relief
beyond “creating humanitarian space,” but it is not known how assistance will be
implemented in a postwar Iraq.  According to the United Nations, diplomats began
negotiating a new Security Council resolution to permit the adjustment of the OFFP
to continue providing food aid to the Iraqi people during and following the war. New
reports suggest that the United States and Britain have begun drafting a plan to use
Iraqi oil proceeds in a $40 billion U.N.-controlled account drawn from the OFFP.
The plan has been submitted by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who would set
priorities on the humanitarian needs and supplies of Iraq. In keeping with this
development, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has asked the Security Council to adopt
a resolution authorizing him to administer humanitarian aid, including distribution
of food under the OFFP, for Iraq.  The Security Council has been trying to resolve
its differences and come up with a plan this week, and Annan has also called a
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meeting on March 26 in New York of top U.N. relief agencies to discuss
coordination of aid.
Planning for eventual re-entry of humanitarian organizations is also underway.
A first donor-NGO liaison meeting was held in Kuwait on March 21. After an
assessment of security, aid agencies plan to conduct rapid evaluations of
humanitarian needs, access, and logistics, and then establish bases within Iraq from
which to start relief operations.  Relief organizations fear that receiving protection
from coalition-led forces could mean an increase in security risks for their staff.
Funding and Other Assistance. The total amounts being spent by the
United States on contingency planning for humanitarian assistance and the projected
funds required are not yet readily available. The Administration’s request for an
FY2003 supplemental appropriations, including additional aid for Iraq, is expected
shortly.  The United States has positioned $154 million for Iraq’s humanitarian relief,
food distribution, and reconstruction. Of that amount, $35 million has been spent to
date on contingency planning with 17.3 million on prepositioning of commodities.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) at the State Department
has spent $15.6 million; $22 million has been allocated to the Emergency Refugee
and Migration Account (ERMA).  
The United Nations has appealed for $123.5 million to provide humanitarian
assistance and food, increase staffing for relief operations, develop joint services for
the aid community, and prepare for post-war Iraqi relief.  So far, it has received
pledges of about $45 million, with $35 million received.  The WFP continues to
stockpile food near Iraq.  During the week of March 17, the United States pledged
to release 600,000 tonnes of food. Australia agreed to ship 100,000 tonnes.
Congress has been concerned about burden sharing, about how much the United
States should pay in relation to other donors, aid priorities, and the possible use of
oil revenues to offset humanitarian and reconstruction costs.  Still to be determined
is the role of the international donor community and neighboring countries in
contributing to immediate post-war efforts.  International contributions received so
far from donors, including the EU, New Zealand, Australia, Spain, the UK, and
Belgium amount to more than $130 million.  Others have provided assistance to
neighboring countries to ease the humanitarian burden; for example, Japan has
pledged $104 million to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority; Russia is giving in-
kind emergency supplies to Iran.
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International and Domestic Legal Issues 
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, March 21, 2003)
The use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises a number
of domestic and  international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article I, § 8, of the
Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under international law
if seen as a preemptive use of force; and (3) the effect of United Nations Security
Council resolutions on the matter.  The following subsections give brief overviews
of these issues and provide links to reports that discuss these matters in greater detail.
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.  The use of military
force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions under both
the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.  Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and historically
Congress has employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and
authorizations for the use of force.  Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the
“executive Power” of the government in the President and designates him the
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States ....”  Because of
these separate powers, and because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues
to the President by virtue of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation,
controversy has often arisen about the extent to which the President may use military
force without congressional authorization.  While all commentators agree that the
President has the constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden
attack without congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether,
and the extent to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, as in Iraq,
must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional. 
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.”  Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
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Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force. 
In the present circumstance these legal requirements seemingly have been met
and any controversy under domestic law about the President’s use of force resolved.
As noted earlier in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002,
authorizes the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he
determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security
of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”  As predicates
for the use of force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his
determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not
“adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent”
with the battle against terrorism.  On March 18, 2003, President Bush sent a letter to
Congress making these determinations.
P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is “intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution” and, thus, waives the time limitations that would otherwise be applicable
under the WPR.  The statute also requires the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expresses
congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions, but it does not condition the use of force on
prior Security Council authorization.  The authorization does not contain any time
limitation.
Finally, subsequent to enactment of the authorization twelve members of the
House of Representatives, along with a number of U.S. soldiers and the families of
soldiers, filed suit against President Bush seeking to enjoin any military action
against Iraq on the grounds it would exceed the authority granted by the October
resolution or, alternatively, that the October resolution unconstitutionally delegates
Congress’ power to declare war to the President.  On February 24, 2003, the trial
court dismissed the suit on the grounds it raised a nonjusticiable political question;
and on March 13, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed,
albeit on different grounds.  The appellate court stated that, although the current
mobilization clearly imposes hardships on the plaintiffs soldiers and family members,
the current situation is too fluid to determine whether there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the political branches on the matter; and, thus, the issues are not ripe
for judicial review.  On the nondelegation issue, the appellate court observed that the
Constitution allows Congress to confer substantial discretionary authority on the
President, particularly with respect to foreign affairs, and that in this instance there
was no “clear evidence of congressional abandonment of the authority to declare war
to the President.”  “[T]he appropriate recourse for those who oppose war with Iraq,”
the First Circuit concluded, “lies with the political branches.”  See Doe v. Bush, 203
U.S. App. LEXIS 4477 (1st Cir. 2003).
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International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force.  In his speech to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s
persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance
of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the
specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech
and others, the President left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the
United States would act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past
commitments and that the U.S. might well use military force to accomplish that
objective.
The United States, with a number of allies, has now begun a military campaign
against Iraq.  Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one
question that arises is whether this use of force, if considered apart from Security
Council resolutions, is legitimate under international law.  International law
traditionally has recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that
right continues to be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  That right has also
traditionally included the right to use force preemptively.  But to be recognized as
legitimate, preemption has had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack
has had to be imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be  proportionate to the
threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces.  But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the
potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has arguably altered that
equation.  The Bush Administration, in particular, has contended that “we must adapt
the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s ... rogue
states and terrorists” and allow what has in the past been deemed “preventive” rather
than preemptive war.70  With respect to Iraq, the Administration has asserted that we
are proceeding on the basis of our “inherent right of self defense, recognized in
Article 51 of the UN Charter.”  But there is doubt that the traditional criterion of
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threat of imminent attack has been met.  If it is not deemed to have been met, the use
of force against Iraq arguably implements an expanded doctrine of preemption and
seemingly could presage similar uses of force against other states deemed to be
potential threats.  Thus, the use of force against Iraq provides a singular opportunity
to examine whether the legal standards governing preemption ought to be
reformulated.  Indeed, the justifications proffered by the U.S. and its allies for the use
of force in this instance, if not successfully challenged, could well shape what in the
future comes to be deemed a lawful preemptive use of force.
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Security Council Authorization.  Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law  recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right.  But the Charter was
intended to change this legal situation.  The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”  To that end it mandates
that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....”  It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council.  While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans.  In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the “inherent right” of
States to use force in self-defense.
On March 17, 2003, the United States, Great Britain, and Spain abandoned
efforts in the Security Council to obtain an explicit authorization for the use of force
against Iraq.  Nonetheless, the U.S. and Great Britain have both contended that earlier
resolutions of the Security Council adopted in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
in 1990 provide sufficient and continuing authority for the use of force against Iraq.
After a number of resolutions calling on Iraq to withdraw had gone unheeded, the
Council in Resolution 678, adopted on November 29, 1990, authorized Member
States “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security
in the area.”  Following the conflict, the Council on April 3, 1991, adopted
Resolution 687, which set forth numerous obligations that Iraq had to meet as
conditions of securing a cease-fire, including total disarmament and unconditional
agreement not to develop or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or
facilities or components related to them.  Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed
previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including Resolution 678.  Thus, the Attorney
General of Great Britain in a legal opinion released on March 17 and the White
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House in a report released on March 19 contend that  “a material breach of resolution
687 revives the authority to use force under resolution 678.”  Noting that the Council
in Resolution 1441 last fall had, once again, determined Iraq to be in material breach
of its disarmament obligations and contending that Iraq has breached its obligations
under that resolution as well, both argue that the current use of force is lawful. 
Nonetheless, that does not appear to be the view of a number of members of the
Security Council, including some of the permanent members.  These states
emphasize that Resolution 1441, while deeming Iraq to be in “material breach” of its
obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced inspections regime” in
order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,”
and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if it continued to fail to meet
its obligations.  They also emphasize that Resolution 1441 did not itself authorize
Member States to use force but mandated that the Council “convene immediately”
in the event Iraq interfered with the inspections regime or otherwise failed to meet
its disarmament obligations.  Thus, they conclude, Resolution 1441 contemplated
that the use of force against Iraq would be legitimate only upon the adoption of
another resolution.  
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Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated March 24, 2003)
Currently, the Defense Department is financing the mobilization of forces and
the deployment of troops and equipment for a  war with Iraq using regular FY2003
funding with many billions already expended for the deployment of troops and
equipment. The war-related FY2003 supplemental is widely expected to be delivered
to Congress during the week of March 24, although further delays are possible.
 
The House completed its consideration of this year’s budget resolution on
March 20, 2003 and included the President’s proposed tax cut; the Senate is slated
to complete its debate on the resolution on March 26, 2003.  On March 21, 2003, by
a vote of 52 to 47, the Senate passed an amendment to the FY2004 budget resolution
that creates a $100 billion  reserve fund to cover the cost of the war in Iraq that would
be financed by reducing the size of the tax cut by $10 billion annually between 2003
and 2013. The amendment may be reconsidered when the Senate takes up the
resolution again on Tuesday, March 25.71 
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76 In FY2002, the Administration requested $20.1 billion in this account and Congress re-
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Many in Congress have been concerned about the Administration’s
unwillingness to provide any estimates of the cost of a war in Iraq, which press
reports peg at between $60 billion and $100 billion.72  In a hearing before the House
Budget Committee on February 27, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz
refused to provide any estimate and White House officials had continued to refuse
to provide estimates citing the uncertainty of war scenarios, but now tell reporters
that the President will request $80 billion shortly.73  
According to press reports and executive branch sources, the $80 billion
supplemental may include about $62 billion to cover the cost of the war in Iraq,
occupation, and keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan and enhanced security in the
United States for the remainder of the year, plus aid to Allies, reconstruction costs,
and humanitarian assistance.74  According to press reports, the supplemental may
include about $51 billion for military operations, $4 billion for replacement of
munitions, $2.6 billion for preparatory tasks including logistical support from allies,
about $2 billion for equipment purchases and R&D, $1.7 billion for classified
programs, and $2 billion for other defense needs.75
For the cost of the war itself, the Administration’s request appears to be based
on assumptions of a short, one-month war, rapid de-activation of the 150,000
reservists who have been mobilized for Iraq, and a six-month occupation, all
assumptions that some observers would consider optimistic. The bulk of DOD’s
funding is being requested in the Defense Emergency Response Fund, a transfer
account that gives the department maximum flexibility to move funds between
accounts but may raise concerns about accountability among the appropriators.76
The Administration’s request may also include funding for aid to nations
supporting the United States in the Iraqi war including Israel, Egypt, and some 19
other countries, proposals that have already raised concerns in Congress both because
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of their potential size and the effect on domestic spending levels as well as possible
foreign policy repercussions.77 Funding of about $3 billion may be proposed for
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, which appear to be underway with
contracts already out for bids according to press reports.78 About $1.8 billion may be
requested for reconstruction and about $800 million for relief assistance.79  
Because of  uncertainties about both the course of the war itself and postwar
needs, estimates of the total cost of war and war-related costs by observers outside
the Administration range widely (see Table 1 below).  On the basis of current
deployments, CBO recently raised  its estimate for the cost of the war alone to $33
billion for a one-month war and $41 billion for a two-month war.80  Some observers
have emphasized that the cost for the United States could be substantially higher than
in the first Persian Gulf war because U.S. allies are less likely to contribute to either
the cost of the war itself or to post-war occupation.81
The role of allies in postwar occupation is a particular concern of Army officials
who worry that if a large postwar occupation force is required for one or two years,
the readiness of  U.S. forces could be taxed.82 Estimates of the number of occupation
forces needed have ranged from 50,000-75,000, an estimate reportedly under
consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  to over 200,000, an estimate proposed by
both General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, and retired military and
other experts with recent experience in the Balkans or the 1991 Gulf war.83  The
Administration’s estimate appears to include funding for a relatively small
occupation force for six months.
Members of Congress have cited concern about the effect of war costs on the
deficit.  If  war costs reach $100 billion in the first year, the FY2003 deficit would
increase by one-third from about $300 billion to $400 billion, setting a new record
in real terms (i.e. when adjusted for inflation) though still a smaller percent of the
GDP than in 1983.84 The effect of war costs on the deficit is part of the ongoing
debate on the FY2004 budget resolution. 
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estimates below.  Those estimates suggest war costs could range between $33 billion
and $60 billion, while the costs of aid to allies, occupation, reconstruction, and
humanitarian assistance could range between $35 billion and $69 billion  in the first
year depending on the size of the occupation force, the amount for aid to Allies, the
scope of humanitarian assistance, and the sharing of reconstruction aid.  Total costs
in the first year could range from about $68 billion to $129 billion. (see Table 1
below). 
Table 1. Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq
(in billions of dollars )
Category Lower Enda Higher Endb
One or Two Month War  33.0 59.8
  War Only Subtotal 33.0 59.8
Occupation Force 19.0 38.8
Reconstruction 5.0 10.0
Aid to Allies 10.0 18.0
Humanitarian aid 1.2 2.4
  War-related Subtotal 34.6 69.2
  Total 67.6 129.0
Notes and Sources:
a Lower end reflects CBO revised estimate of cost of one-month war reflecting current deployments,
a 10 month occupation of 100,000 troops, the U.S. paying half of the U.N.’s estimate of $30
billion for reconstruction over three years, humanitarian aid for 10 % of the population, and $10
billion in aid to allies based on State Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War
Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” February 26, 2003. 
b Higher end estimate reflects House Budget Committee estimate of cost of a 250,000 force, a 10-
month occupation of 200,000 troops, the U.S. paying the full cost of reconstruction,
humanitarian aid for 20% of the population and $18 billion in aid to allies based on State
Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,”
February 26, 2003.
Although the Defense Department has not provided any official estimates of the
potential costs of a war with Iraq although Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in
interviews several weeks ago that $50 billion would be “on the high side.”85  The
Office of Management and Budget has prepared an internal estimate, which
reportedly projects costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the estimate publicly,
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86 CBO revised its estimates based on current deployments in CBO, An Analysis of the
President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004, March 2003, p. 4; see
[http://www.cob.gov]. CBO’s methodology uses cost factors of the services. 
87 See [http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf]
88 See House Budget Committee, above,  and Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Backgrounder, Potential Cost of a War with Iraq and its Post-War Occupation
by Steven M. Kosiak, February 25, 2003 [http://www.csbaonline.org].
89 “Congress Questions Cost of War-Related Aid,” Washington Post, March 17,l 2003; “U.S.
Builds War Coalition With Favors And Money,” USA Today, February 25, 2003.
90 CBO, Letter cited.  Costs would be higher if U.S. peacekeepers engaged in reconstruction
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and it has not explained the assumptions underlying its projections. An earlier
estimate by former chief White House economist Larry Lindsey of $100 billion to
$200 billion was dismissed by the Administration.
War Costs.  Predicting the cost of a war is uncertain and would vary with the
size of the force deployed and the duration of the conflict.  Although most observers
predict that a war would be short, others predict that the war could last longer,
particularly if the U.S. encountered chemical or biological attacks, had to fight urban
warfare in Baghdad, or encountered more resistance than anticipated. The
Congressional Budget Office has published revised estimates of the costs of a war
reflecting current force deployments.  Using their assumptions, a one-month war
would cost $33 billion and a two-month war would cost $41 billion.86  Using a
methodology based on the costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Democratic
staff of the House Budget Committee estimated that a two-month war that deployed
250,000 troops would cost $53 billion to $60 billion, an estimate closer to that used
by Secretary Rumsfeld.87  An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA) that blends the two approaches, suggested that a two month
war would cost about $35 billion. A six-month war, with the same force size, could
cost substantially more,  ranging from $50 billion using CBO’s figures to $85 billion
using CSBA’s approach.88  
Related Aid to Allies.  The cost of aid to allies to ensure access for U.S.
troops, as in the case of Turkey or to provide compensation for economic losses or
refugee costs, as in the case of Pakistan or Jordan and Egypt and Israel, is uncertain.
Discussions are reportedly underway. Press reports have mentioned requests from
allies for both grants and loan guarantees including from Israel, Egypt, Jordan,  and
others.89  Based on those press reports, such aid to allies could add many billions to
the cost of the war.  With Turkey’s refusal to provide basing support for U.S. forces,
their aid package is unlikely to materialize.  It is not clear how much is included for
aid to allies in the reported totals for the FY2003 supplemental.  
Occupation.  The cost of a post-war occupation would vary depending on the
number of forces and the duration of their stay.  Using factors based on the recent
experience for peacekeepers, CBO estimated that monthly occupation costs would
range from $1.4 billion for 75,000 personnel to $3.8 billion for 200,000 personnel,
a force size that was considered by the U.S. Central Command.90  A year-long
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activities like rebuilding bridges.
91 “A Huge Postwar Force Seen,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.
92  Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Backgrounder.  CSBA uses the same
factors as CBO.
93 “U.N. Estimates rebuilding Iraq Will Cost $30 Billion.” New York Times, January 31,
2003.
94 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 66-67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf].
95  CBO, Letter to Senator Kent Conrad and Congressman John M. Spratt, Jr, concerning
cots of a potential war with Iraq, September 30, 2002; see
 [ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf].
occupation force of 100,000 troops would cost $22.8 billion and a force of 200,000
troops would cost $45.6 billion using these factors.  That estimate was recently
buttressed by testimony from  the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, stating
his view that several hundred thousand troops could be needed initially.91  Under
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz recently disavowed this estimate, suggesting that a
smaller U.S. force was likely and that Allies would contribute as well. 
 An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pegged
the post-war occupation cost at $105 billion over 5 years, assuming an initial
peacekeeping force of 150,000 troops declining to 100,000 troops the second year
and 65,000 troops for the following 3 years.92 If the peacekeeping role were shared
with the U.N. or other nations, the costs to the U.S. would be lower. Press reports
suggest that the Administration is considering an occupation of about 2 years. 
Reconstruction.  According to United Nations agencies, the cost of
rebuilding Iraq after a war could run at least $30 billion in the first 3 years.93  Nobel
prize-winning economist William D. Nordhaus has indicated that reconstruction in
Iraq could cost between $30 billion over 3 to 4 years, based on World Bank factors
used in estimating rebuilding costs elsewhere, to $75 billion over 6 years using the
costs of the Marshall Plan as a proxy.94 
If Iraqi oil fields are not damaged, some observers have suggested that oil
revenues could pay for occupation or reconstruction.  Most of those revenues,
however,  are used for imports under the U.N. Oil for Food Program or for domestic
consumption.  Although expansion of Iraqi oil production may be possible over time,
additional revenues would not be available for some time.  The only additional
revenues available immediately might be those from the estimated 400,000 barrels
per day that Iraq currently smuggles and that generate about $3 billion a year.95  
Humanitarian Assistance.  Estimates of post-war humanitarian assistance
for emergency food and medical supplies have been estimated at about $2.5 billion
the first year, and $10 billion over 4 years, assuming that about 20% of Iraq’s
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96  American Academy of Arts & Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf].  This estimate
assumes a cost of $500 per person per year based on the experience in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the 1990s. 
population of 24 million needed help.96  If the number needing help were lower or
other nations or the U.N. contributed, the cost to the U.S. would be lower.  
Economic Repercussions.  Some observers have suggested that a war with
Iraq could lead to a spike in the cost of oil generated by a disruption in the supplies
that could, in turn, tip the economy into recession.  For an analysis, see below, Oil
Supply Issues.  Such a scenario could increase the cost to the U.S. economy
substantially. 
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The armed conflict in Iraq raises concerns over that nation’s supply of crude oil
to world markets. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports that Iraq
held 112.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s currently
known reserves –  second only to Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels. Despite holding
such large reserves, Iraq’s current rate of crude oil production is much below its
ultimate potential. With investment in facilities, technology, and better operating
methods, Iraq could rank as a top producer, a development that could change world
oil market dynamics.
Under U.N. Resolution 986, the “oil for food” program, Iraq’s oil exports have
varied greatly; in some weeks virtually no oil has been exported, in others as much
as 3.0 million barrels per day (mbd) have entered world markets. On March 17, 2003,
the U.N. withdrew its staff from Iraq, leaving the program in limbo. Now it seems as
if continued fighting in the southern part of Iraq – source of roughly half the oil
exported under U.N. Res. 986 – has caused the halt of exports from the Persian Gulf
port at Umm Qasr. The remainder of Iraq’s exports – mainly produced in and around
the Kirkuk field in the north – is shipped via twin pipelines across Turkey to the
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Tanker loadings there were reportedly halted
sometime last week; it now seems as if crude availability there should dwindle
quickly, regardless of tankers’ willingness to call.
 Prior to the onset of fighting, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reported that
exports  averaged 1.7 mbd under the oil-for-food program. In addition, Iraq likely
supplied another 400,000 barrels to adjacent countries outside the U.N. run program.
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Despite the off-and-on nature of Iraq’s international oil flow, the oil market has relied
on Iraqi supply, which played a role in the determination of crude oil prices and other
supplier-purchaser arrangements. Iraq accounted for about 10% of average oil
production by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq  is
an OPEC member but does not participate in the cartel’s quota program (as do the
10 other members) because Iraqi exports have been controlled by the U.N.
Crude prices recently touched $40 per barrel, the record levels from 1990-1991.
The price spike resulted from supply difficulties due to an oil workers’ strike in
Venezuela, as well as overriding concerns about Persian Gulf oil supply. The
Venezuelan strike, which began on December 2, 2002, seems at least partially
resolved; oil exports appear to be somewhat above half pre-strike amounts and are
increasing slowly.  War jitters about crude supply appear to ebb and flow, as crude
closed in New York trading at $26 per barrel on Friday, March 21, despite escalated
fighting in Iraq.  But the passage of a few days saw prices rise into the $28 area (on
the opening of trading Monday) with expanded fighting and the apparent cessation
of exports from Iraq.
It is too early to predict when Iraqi exports might resume. When and if pre-strike
output levels in Venezuela will be reached is also uncertain. And new unrest in
Nigeria, another source of world market supply, has resulted in the shutting-in of a
reported 400,000 barrels per day of output. Were the supply shortfalls from
Venezuela and Nigeria to continue through spring – and events in the Persian Gulf
continue to shut in Iraq’s crude oil supply – OPEC members would be hard pressed
to make up the lost crude.
OPEC members upped production in February 2003 by 1.3 million barrels per
day. OPEC now has virtually no surplus capacity left to meet any reduction in oil
output elsewhere in the world.  Although not precisely in a crude supply shortfall
situation, world markets are on the verge of a shortfall, creating a situation in which
oil prices could easily spike.  If the Iraq conflict were to spread beyond its borders to
Kuwait – as Saddam Hussein has threatened – or affect tanker traffic in the Persian
Gulf, genuine oil shortfall could take place, resulting in more significant pressure on
supply and price. At this update, prices are well off recent highs, but oil markets are
extremely volatile and prices can fluctuate markedly depending on events and their
interpretation.
For the longer outlook, should Iraq experience a change of government, the
country could have the resources to become a much larger oil producer, increasing
world supply and changing the oil price paradigm that has prevailed since the Iranian
political upheaval of 1978-1979.  This eventuality could unleash a new set of
political and economic forces in the region; it could also change the complexion of
the world oil market by enhancing future crude oil availability.
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This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at 
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products 
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Military Deployments
For information on U.S. armed forces deployed in connection with the Iraq
crisis, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces.
Humanitarian Aid Organizations and Iraq
CRS Report RL31766, Iraq, United Nations and Humanitarian Aid
Organizations.
Iraq Facts 
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources.  The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
CRS-47
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
This CRS web page includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq
confrontation. 
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter233.html].
The following CRS page focuses on official sources, including sources in both the
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
For the draft “second resolution” introduced by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Spain on February 24, 2003, see
[http://www.un.int/usa/scdraft-iraq-2-24-03]
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted  Resolution 1441,  holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations.  For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.
